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he task for reformers in China today seems to be straightforward: liberalising and opening 
the economy. The most recent ‘third plenum’ did continue this approach, pledging that the 
market should be given a decisive role in guiding the Chinese economy. This is indeed what 
economic theory and all the evidence suggests: allowing the market to play a greater role in the 
production of goods and services, and opening this market to the outside world should foster 
growth and productivity. 
However, China has already achieved astonishing progress on this road in recent decades and 
might now have reached a level of income at which the problem is no longer simply to let the 
market operate. On the contrary, some of the key problems China faces today require a stronger 
role for the government in regulating the market. 
The  need  for  a  stronger  role  of  the  government  is  starkest  if  one  considers  pollution.  This  is 
obviously a problem that will not be resolved by the market. On the contrary, combating pollution 
requires  more  state  intervention,  both  at  the  central  and  the  local  level.  The  central  level  of 
government must set the general rules on air and water quality, but these general rules must be 
implemented at the local level in order to become effective. There might be resistance at the local 
level because improving the environment is costly. But the pressure for change from local people 
who cannot breathe the air over their cities or whose water is undrinkable will provide a strong 
spur to local officials to act. 
Once the local and central government begin pushing in the same direction, there can be little 
doubt that China has the resources to improve the quality of its air and water in much the same 
way that it created the world’s biggest manufacturing sector. Reducing smog requires essentially 
more investment: more investment in filters for steel plants, more investment in public transport 
(such  as  subways)  to  reduce  people’s  dependence  on  automobiles  and  more  investment  in 
canalisation and water purification plants. The fight against smog and water pollution plays to the 
strength of the country: its huge availability of domestic savings to finance all this investment. 
However, the need for more investment to combat local pollution has a side effect: it makes the 
rebalancing of the economy more difficult. The official aim of economic policy is to shift growth 
from  investment  and  exports  towards  consumption.  But  here  is  the  catch:  more  consumption 
today would just lead to a further aggravation of the pollution problem. However, investing more 
in pollution control and infrastructure makes it more difficult to achieve the rebalancing goal. As 
economists say, you cannot have your cake and eat it too. Rebalancing is likely to be pushed into 
the background because the environment is more urgent today. 
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But  there  are  also  other  areas  of  the  economy  that  cannot  be  left  to  market  forces  alone.  For 
example, network industries like telecoms, gas, electricity and water tend to become monopolistic 
or oligopolistic if left to the market. These sectors have to be regulated and supervised. Well-run 
economies achieve higher levels of welfare not because there is less regulation, but because they 
have more efficient regulation. The best regulation of network industries lets market forces operate 
as far as possible, but prevents the emergence of monopolies and even regulates prices where 
necessary to prevent an exploitation of consumers.  
Eliminating subsidies for producers and consumers of coal or oil is certainly also needed. But this 
is straightforward compared to the task of creating and implementing an efficient regulation for 
the energy market as a whole. 
The  biggest  area  in  need  of  reform  is  finance.  This  sector  also  requires  a  much  more  subtle 
approach  than  just  liberalising  market  forces  and  opening  to  the  outside  world.  The  global 
financial crisis has confirmed once more that the financial market requires tight supervision if it is 
to work well.  
It is difficult to overstate the importance of financial markets for China and the global economy. 
In most of the advanced world, investment amounts to little more than 15% of GDP, compared to 
close to 45% for China. This implies that the financial market is in a certain sense almost three 
times  more  important  for  China  than  it  is  for  the  US  or  Europe  because  it  has  the  task  of 
intermediating resources that are three times larger as a share of GDP. 
The rest of the world has a vital interest that the reform of financial markets in China succeeds 
because the country is now the biggest source of savings in the world economy. The GDP of China 
is still lower than that of the US or the EU (about $10 trillion for China, compared to about $14 
trillion for the US and a similar value for the EU). But given that China’s savings rate is so much 
higher, the supply of savings from China alone is larger than that of the US and the EU combined. 
It  is  vital  for  the  global  economy  that  its  biggest  source  of  savings  is  channelled  towards 
productive investment. 
Today China’s financial system is dominated by its banks. The deposits at the Chinese banking 
system, which economists call M2, now amount to slightly more than 100 trillion yuan, which is 
much larger than the country’s GDP. The banking sector is thus much larger in China than in other 
countries of a similar level of development. But around the banking sector, which is still in the 
hands of the state, a large ‘shadow-banking’ sector has also evolved. Variants of such shadow-
banking sectors have led to unhealthy forms of finance in many countries. This is a sector that also 
requires more state intervention in the form of regulation and oversight, not less. 
A strong Chinese banking sector is also vital for the global financial system because in absolute 
terms the deposits at the country’s banks (M2) are already now much larger than those in the US 
or the euro area. China now also has the world’s largest financial system. If this system, which is 
still growing strongly, as shown in the figure below, were to be opened quickly to the rest of the 
world, the consequences for global financial markets could be severe. When the financial crisis 
erupted on both sides of the North Atlantic, the Chinese financial system was still much smaller, 
but it has outgrown both the US and the euro area by a wide margin since. This combination of 
size and growth could soon constitute a major risk factor for the global financial system if the 
system is not very tightly regulated. 
Interest rates need to remain much higher in China than in the US or the EU simply because China 
will continue to grow much more quickly than the developed world. Experience has shown that 
large interest rate differentials can lead to large flows of ‘hot money’, which add little to the proper 
allocation of savings, but can create huge macroeconomic distortions, both when the money flows 
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In principle, it should be easy for the government to control the banking system, given that most 
banks  are  owned  by  the  state.  In  reality,  however,  state-owned  banks  are  de  facto  often  not 
controlled by the state, but by their managers and the particular economic interest groups that 
have the most influence on the selection of the managers and the policy choices of the banks. The 
experience in Europe and elsewhere has shown that merely privatising state-owned banks often 
does not improve the situation. The key to creating an efficient banking system is, in any event, the 
ability to evaluate credit risk, a skill that can only be learned through experience.  
So privatising banks is not an urgent issue. The one measure that is certainly needed is to increase 
interest rates. Paying savers 3% when nominal GDP is growing at 10% or more is not sufficient. 
Much higher interest rates would be required to ensure that households that save do not see their 
savings continue to be devalued relative to wages and other income. This would also encourage 
them not to invest in the shadow banking system and spend a bit more instead on accumulating 
ever-higher  deposits  in  the  hope  of  achieving  a  nest  egg  that  could  support  them  during 
retirement. 
Higher interest rates on lending would also help to reduce overinvestment. But just liberalising 
lending  rates  would  not  be  appropriate.  In  a  system  with  lots  of,  often  implicit,  government 
guarantees, it is not always the most efficient enterprises that will be willing to pay higher interest 
rates. Liberalising lending rates might just lead those with government guarantees (or those simply 
too big to fail) to outbid smaller and more efficient enterprises, thus resulting in more waste of 
capital and achieving the opposite of what an efficient financial system should do. 
Even more important than liberalising the banking system would be to set up the infrastructure for 
wider securities markets so that enterprises have an alternative source of financing, and savers 
have alternative reliable investment vehicles. A financial market of the size of China’s should not 
be so completely dominated by banks. But developing market-based financing (via bonds and 
equity)  requires  a  number  of  deep  reforms  of  accounting  standards  and  reliable  financial 
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indicators, especially for smaller enterprises. All these measures would require a strengthening of 
state capacity to enforce rules.  
China finds itself at a difficult crossroads for the reforms: continuing in the direction that so far has 
been followed with astounding success, namely giving the market a greater role and opening to 
the  rest  of  the  world,  might  no  longer  be  sufficient:  combating  pollution  requires  more  state 
intervention,  not  less.  Strengthening  a  huge,  potentially  unstable,  financial  system  requires 
stronger oversight and some continuing separation from the global financial system. Navigating 
this  change  in  the  right  direction  will  be  crucial  not  only  for  China,  but  also  for  the  global 
economy. 
 